0973
Z1092
Greece SECRET # 2125
5/24/44
V-20

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis Branch

R & A No. 2125

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE DIVISION
FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN
REF

THE GREEK CRISIS OF APRIL-MAY 1944

Description

A summary of the causes and consequences of the April mutinies of the Greek armed forces, together with an analysis of the present strength and character of the new Premier and the EAM.

24 May 1944

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 USC 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

When this report outlives its usefulness to you, please return to:

Office of Strategic Services
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch
25th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Copy No. 12

(45137)

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary.....iii

I. The Background of the Crisis and the Brief Premiership of Sophocles Venizelos..... 1

II. The Mutiny and Its Suppression..... 6

III. The New Premier..... 11

IV. The EAM and the PEEA..... 15

SUMMARY

The April mutinies in the Greek armed forces, which were suppressed by Greek military and naval detachments operating in close conjunction with the British Army and Navy, were an expression of discontent at the failure of King George and Premier Tsouderos to implement their oft-repeated promise of broadening the government to include representatives of the principal guerrilla factions and political parties. Tsouderos was forced to resign, and, after a series of Cabinet changes, was succeeded by George Papandreou, who has the support of the Allies. Many Greeks regard Papandreou as a tool of the British, and are deeply resentful of British intervention in Greek military and political affairs. Papandreou seems to be opposed to the EAM and its Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA). However recent events have made these organizations the most important factor in Greek politics. The success of the recent settlement appears to depend upon their consent to participate in the Greek Government of National Unity.

THE GREEK CRISIS OF APRIL-MAY 1944

I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS AND THE BRIEF PREMIERSHIP OF SOPHOCLES VENIZELOS

In the course of the April crisis, the premiership changed hands seven times in 23 days (3-26 April). This series of Cabinet changes began with the resignation of Emmanuel Tsouderos, formerly a member of the Metaxas Government, who had been Prime Minister of the Government-in-Exile since the end of April 1941. He was forced to resign because of pressure from the armed forces, which called upon him to consult the Political Committee of the EAM (PEEA) at once, and, in agreement with it, to take immediate steps to broaden his government. A delegation consisting of 14 senior officers and representing the ESDO (National Military Democratic Organization), which had been formed by the Greek Army and Air Forces, personally urged Tsouderos to meet these demands, and then pleaded their case before the Ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR, upon each of whom they paid a separate call.

When Tsouderos failed to act, disturbances broke out in the Greek military and naval establishments in Cairo, Alexandria, and elsewhere in Egypt. These demonstrations reflected the anti-royalist sentiments of a great majority of all ranks in the Army and Navy, which were at this time pressing for the removal of royalist officers and their replacement by liberals. The armed forces seemed to hold the King jointly responsible with Tsouderos for the failure to keep their oft-repeated promise to expand the Cairo Government by including representatives of the Greek underground. Moreover, these Greeks were apprehensive over King George's refusal to sanction the establishment of a Regency under Archbishop Damaskinos of Athens, who, all the

political parties and guerrilla factions in Greece had agreed, should rule in the King's name in the period between liberation and the holding of a plebiscite.

There is some evidence to support their conviction that the King was hoping to be able to remain in power until the plebiscite, and even possibly to return to Greece before a plebiscite could be held. In addition, the King's pronouncements on the matter of his return to Greece was considered unsatisfactory. In December 1943, in direct response to British pressure, King George had stated publicly that, when the proper time came, he would discuss with his ministers the advisability of his return to Greece before a plebiscite. In view of the anti-royalist convictions of a majority of the Cabinet, this statement was interpreted to mean that the King would not return to Greece unless he was recalled by popular referendum.

Nevertheless, misgivings have been expressed in many quarters; and there is a widespread insistence that the King make a less ambiguous declaration on this subject. In fact, the King has few reasons to feel optimistic about the prospects for regaining his throne. According to the report of Tsouderos' own agent, Vilos, who made a trip to Greece early this year, 99 percent of the Greek people may be described as hostile to the King. Indeed, the anti-monarchical trend among Greeks throughout the world was considered so strong at the beginning of the month of April, that Venizelos and Karapanayotis, Ministers of Marine and War respectively in the Cabinet of Tsouderos, seriously thought of the advisability of renouncing the King and setting up a republic. However, they abandoned this project and decided to oust Tsouderos instead. They were joined by Admiral Vasiliades, a recent arrival in Cairo, who had come from Greece as a representative of three pre-war political leaders, Sophoulis, Gonatas, and Papandreou. All three demand the resignation of

Tsouderos in order to prevent the dissolution of the Greek armed forces. Confronted by demands from the armed forces, from two of his principal colleagues, and from pro-EAM as well as anti-EAM representatives (Vasiliades is opposed to the EAM), Tsouderos had no choice but to resign his post.

On 3 April Tsouderos cabled his resignation to King George, who was at the time in London, and asked that Venizelos be appointed Prime Minister. King George refused to accept Tsouderos' resignation and ordered Venizelos to London to give a personal explanation of the course of events. Venizelos declined the King's invitation and gave up his efforts to organize a new government. He even was reported to have stated that he would not take the premiership even if the King offered it to him. He took this stand, it is said, because he disapproved the King's appeal to the British to restore order in the armed forces. Tsouderos then tendered his resignation once again, and installed in the premiership Roussos (a republican politician, former Minister to the U.S., who resigned in January 1944 as Tsouderos' Vice-Premier presumably out of discontent with his chief's monarchical views). There matters rested until 7 April, when, at a meeting of the Cabinet, it was voted that Venizelos should become Premier. At this time Venizelos seemed to have decided to accept, but on the following day, both Venizelos and Roussos announced that, because of the continuing unrest in the armed forces, they would not undertake the formation of a government. At the same time they protested against the arrest by British officials of Greek nationals at Alexandria and Cairo. The Cabinet of Tsouderos, including Venizelos, then (8 April) decided unanimously to continue in office until the end of the emergency.

On 11 April King George arrived in Cairo. In the course of a radio appeal for unity he renewed his promise

that he would abide by the results of a plebiscite and declared that arrangements were being made to select a Cabinet which would include members of the guerrilla forces. However, he did not throw any light on his plans for the period between the German withdrawal from Greece and the holding of a plebiscite. His pledge for a reorganization of the government was probably inspired by his talks (11 and 12 April) with Ambassador Leeper, General Paget, Admiral Cunningham, and Air Marshal Parke, who were firm on this point. He seems also to have been influenced by his conferences with representatives of all Greek parties, including the Communists.

Venizelos overcame his reluctance to accept the premiership. On 14 April he set up a new Cabinet, which he described as a non-political group of technicians, and which was to have as its main task the conduct of negotiations with the political parties and resistance organizations inside Greece until a new government on the broadest possible national basis could be formed. In the course of the 3-week crisis during which he had thrice held the premiership for a total of approximately 12 days, Venizelos is reported to have changed his mind several times concerning the trustworthiness of the EAM and the desirability of British armed intervention in Greek affairs. British officials repeatedly referred to him as weak, timid, and ineffective. However, the same officials seem to have been pleased with the appointment Voulgaris as Commander in Chief of the Greek Navy (19 April) to succeed Admiral Alexandris, who is said to have been dismissed for his sympathy with the demands of the mutineers and for his unwillingness to resort to violence in quelling the rebellion. Venizelos himself has claimed credit for the relatively bloodless suppression of the revolt, and is said to feel that the British failed to appreciate the

important service he rendered them, at the risk of his political future, by putting down the rebellion with Greek forces. In Venizelos' own opinion, he prevented the sinking of the Greek fleet by the British. Moreover, it is reported that he is particularly offended by the abrupt manner in which he was brushed aside (23 April) in favor of Papandreou, the present Prime Minister (sworn in 26 April), who had escaped from Greece only a short time before. He attributes Papandreou's appointment to British influence.

The new Prime Minister's most immediate task was to be the formation of a government of National Unity. For this purpose, he was asked to preside at a Conference, to be held in the Lebanon in mid-May, of delegates representing all Greek political factions.

II. THE MUTINY AND ITS SUPPRESSION

The mutiny, which began as a political demonstration against King George and Premier Tsouderos, acquired a strongly anti-British direction, when the British demanded that the Greeks surrender their munitions and their vessels. The Greek Ministry of War and, apparently, also the Ministry of Marine were taken over by the British. British troops and Egyptian police made preventive arrests throughout Egypt. From the British point of view these actions were taken in fulfilment of British responsibility to maintain order in Egypt among the troops of the Allied governments.

The mutineers, who may have numbered as many as 10,000 men in the Army, Navy, and Air Corps, had the support of thousands of civilians in Egypt. They controlled at least twenty vessels, including six or eight combat ships. They held out for approximately three weeks, from 1 to 23 April, although the crew of the cruiser Averoff did not capitulate until 28 April, and one armored regiment of 350 men staged a brief rebellion near Tripoli in Syria, which lasted until 4 May. Though most of the rebels were cut off from food, electricity, and other supplies, they announced that they were determined to counter force with force. Naval crews kept their guns trained on the British vessels which had been summoned to awe them into submission. Greek armored detachments of the First Brigade brought up their anti-tank guns when the British moved up tanks and indicated that they would use their trench mortars in case of attack. At length, however, they were overpowered by Greek units operating under the protective oversight of the British Army and Navy. The mutineers suffered 56 casualties (12 dead, 44 wounded). Only seven of these (3 dead, 4 wounded) were members of the First Brigade; the rest were navy men. One British officer was killed in the course of the fighting. The British felt

that they kept their actual military intervention to a minimum.

As an aftermath approximately 2,500 men of the First Brigade were segregated in a concentration camp. The instigators of the rebellion are to stand trial before courts-martial to be conducted by Greek officers. Some, it is predicted, will be executed, but most of the men will probably be released and will be permitted to join their comrades (3000 in number), who have been sent to a rest camp somewhere between Tobruk and Alexandria.

Many Greeks have deplored the use of force to break the resistance of the Greek Army and Navy, and the cooperation of the British in the actual suppression. As early as 6 April the ESA (Committee for the Coordination of the Struggle, a group of liberal Greeks in Cairo who have been seeking to promote harmony) appealed to Prime Minister Churchill and the House of Commons and complained against what they termed the "provocative intervention of British services in the Middle East in purely Greek affairs." They protested against the seizure by the British of Greek military installations in Egypt and against the arrest of hundreds of Greek civilians, sailors, and soldiers. In this protest they may have been influenced by reports on the treatment of the Greek prisoners, who were allegedly herded into trucks by the British at the point of sub-machine guns. A British observer reported that these Greeks suffered harsher treatment at the hands of their allies than had the German and Italian prisoners during the North African campaign. Some Greeks have stated plainly that in their opinion the action of the British in this regard did not comply with democratic principles and was an offense to "a nation which has given everything for this cause." They have voiced their suspicion that these acts were prompted

by "reactionary organizations" bent on dissolving the Greek forces in the Middle East.

Similar complaints appeared in a document addressed (7 April) to the Allied Governments by the First Brigade. It is there explained that, in revolting against the Cairo government so as to expedite the formation of a Government of Liberation, the First Brigade was acting "to enforce the will of the people," in accordance with Greek military law. By virtue of this law, it is claimed, the Greek Army has the right of revolting against its commander for 24 hours in order to ascertain the will of the troops in political matters. The First Brigade dutifully re-submitted itself to the orders of its commanding officer at the expiration of the legal limit of 24 hours, partly in response to a British promise that the Brigade would soon have an opportunity to fight the Germans. Shortly thereafter, however, the men were ordered to surrender their weapons. This, they protested, was an insult which they could not endure. In conclusion they implored the U. S., Great Britain, and the USSR to intervene and spare them this humiliation.

The British in Cairo take the view that the mutineers were fanatics, incited by "subversive elements." It is stated by some observers that the British refused to permit the revolt to run its course both because they could not lose face by rescinding their previous order to the Greeks to lay down their arms, and because they were in urgent need of the Greek Navy (which is said to constitute 35 percent of the Allied fleets in the Middle East) for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. In general the British seemed to regard the mutinies as an expression of disloyalty to the Allied cause, provoked by fifth column agitation and by EAM agents. The British view is accepted by the Atlantis, conservative Greek language daily in New York.

The great majority of Greeks in Cairo and elsewhere, however, are reported to reject the British view. They have asserted that British and American leaders were misinformed, and that the British tactics were both unreasonable and unnecessary. They have expressed their resentment against the arrest of several thousand civilians and members of the armed forces. In answer to the British view, they have pointed out that the Greeks have never abandoned their hostility to the Germans and have never wavered in their devotion to the Allies, that in accordance with the Greek Constitution, the troops were entitled to express their views, and that therefore no justification existed for British intervention. The steps that the British did take have been interpreted as measures in support of the King and not as security measures. It is felt by this section of Greek opinion that Greek unity cannot be achieved until the British abandon their attempts to impose the King upon the Greeks and until the long-awaited coalition government representing the principal factions in Greece is formed.

In spite of the incidents surrounding the mutinies, the Greeks claim to harbor no grudges against the British forces who fired upon them. It can be assumed that they remain true to the Allied cause and anxious to fight the Germans. There is little doubt that a liberating Allied Army, especially if accompanied by American troops, will be received in Greece with great enthusiasm in spite of the events of April. Nevertheless, the Greeks are both tense and unhappy.

The royal entourage, who must be aware of the fact that the mutinies were basically directed against the King and the failure of his government to admit representatives of the underground to the Cabinet, are opposed to what they regard as excessive clemency. The British are reported to

share this view though they are probably motivated by reasons of security. However, if the courts-martial mete out severe penalties, anti-British feeling will probably be intensified. It is reported that the arrest of Karapanayotis, Tsouderos Minister of War, by the British has already contributed to the growth of this sentiment.

Another result of the mutinies was the creation of diplomatic tension between the USSR and Great Britain. Before the mutinies the Russian press frequently criticized the Tsouderos Government, which it described as pro-Fascist. Later Ambassador Novikov and a number of Russian newspaper releases expressed sympathy for the mutineers and blunt criticism of the British for interfering in a purely domestic dispute. Ambassador Leeper, who found Novikov a difficult colleague to work with, considered these statements as a violation of the agreements concluded at Teheran and Moscow and an indication of Russian designs upon Greece. This attitude is reflected in Leeper's remark that the appointment of Papandreou was necessary in order to safeguard Greece from the "Slavic threat." For a period of almost a month, Leeper refused to transmit information on Greece to the Russian Embassy. Prime Minister Churchill also was troubled, and sent a formal note of protest to the Soviet government. In his reply, Molotov stated that the USSR had no interest in Greek affairs, and that the Tass Agency, which had published the dispatches to which the British took exception, had been ordered to verify its sources more carefully in the future. This exchange of notes removed officially the existing tension. However, the Russians, while disclaiming interest in the Greek situation, have once more expressed their support of the EAM and its aims, and it is probable that they will continue to give informal support in the future.

III. THE NEW PREMIER

Premier Papandreou began his career in 1915, at the age of 27, when he was appointed prefect of the island of Lesbos. He was active in Eleutherios Venizelos' Salonica revolutionary government, which broke away from King Constantine to fight on the side of the Allies in the first World War. Later he held a number of important Cabinet posts as a member of the Liberal (Venizelist) Party under General Plastiras in 1923 and subsequently under Eleutherios Venizelos. In recent years he has been the leader of the Socialist Democratic Party, a supposedly radical offshoot of the Liberal Party, which, so far as is known, never succeeded in attracting much following in Greece. His position is said to be to the left of the Liberal Party and to the right of the EAM. The Communist London Daily Worker does not class him as a leftist. He has praised the EAM for its vigorous leadership of the Greek resistance movement, but at the same time has held it largely responsible for the success of the German propaganda which denounces the underground as "Communist." He is said to believe, however, that even the leaders of the EAM recognize their errors and are attempting to make amends for the abuses of extremists within their ranks. The source who has reported these views is of the opinion that "Papandreou fears -- or hopes, perhaps -- that it may be too late now" for the EAM to attempt to redress grievances, and that the EAM may already have lost the popular support it once enjoyed. On the other hand, Papandreou is reported to be in full agreement with the view that a coalition government must be formed and that the Cairo Cabinet has been at fault for having failed to take the proper steps in this direction. Nevertheless, he is unwilling to accept the PEEA as a fitting substitute for such a coalition.

He is basing his policy upon an eight-point program, which, he believes, has so wide an appeal, that not even the leftist parties will oppose it. He has already presented these proposals before the Lebanon conference of delegates from all the political parties and guerrilla factions of Greece, which met as scheduled in the middle of May for the purpose of forming a widely representative coalition government. Papandreou proposes to: 1) reorganize the armed forces in the Middle East and restore discipline; 2) amalgamate the guerrilla bands under a unified government, so that the full military and naval strength of Greece may at the proper time take concerted action against the Germans; 3) abolish terrorism and guarantee the security and political freedom of the people as soon as the enemy withdraws from Greece, through the presence in Free Greece of members of the new coalition government appointed to direct the military forces and the civil administration of the country; 4) insist upon adequate provision for relief during the period of German occupation; 5) maintain order in Greece with the aid of the Allies both during and after the period of liberation so as to ensure freedom from coercion, and thus enable the people to make a free choice of the regime, social constitution, and government best suited to their needs; 6) punish traitors and exploiters; 7) assure, with Allied assistance, the reconstruction and economic rehabilitation of Greece immediately after liberation; 8) secure full satisfaction of the national demands for the complete restoration of the nation and the stabilization of the new frontiers. The Conference is reported to have agreed to this program in its general outline.

Opinions differ as to Papandreou's character. The British seem to regard him highly and have sent him a

message promising support. They report that he has been well received in Cairo, where his record as a liberal and an opponent of the Germans is greatly appreciated. They seem convinced that he has more ability than Venizelos, and are hopeful that his first-hand knowledge of conditions inside Greece will enable him to strike the proper balance in choosing a new government. Basil Vlavianos, editor of the liberal National Herald, Greek language daily in New York, apparently agrees with this estimate of Papandreou, although he doubts that any man, however capable, can restore harmony in Greece so long as the British persist in their hostility to the EAM.

The Communist London Daily Worker, however, describes Papandreou's appointment as a "breathtaking political bluff," and asserts that he has played no known role in the resistance movement. Ambassador Novikov seems to feel that Papandreou is not the man who can solve the Greek problem. This view may have been influenced by the statement ascribed to Papandreou that the Russians are using the EAM to exploit the present crisis and the present wave of Anglophobia to widen the influence of the USSR in what had previously been an exclusively British sphere of influence. In this respect Papandreou seems to share the view of Ambassador Leeper. More specifically, Leeper is said to have referred to the "Russian menace" and to have stated that the time has come for the Greeks to choose whether they prefer to preserve their status as a Mediterranean power by remaining within the British orbit or to forfeit their independence by placing their future in the hands of the USSR. Many Greeks in Cairo seem apprehensive lest the British emphasis on the Communist danger (a favorite subject of German PW) intensify civil strife in Greece by creating pro-Russian and pro-British parties. Such a policy, they declare, would only drive many

Greeks into the arms of the USSR, and would make of Greece a "football of Anglo-Russian antagonism."

In Cairo, Papandreou is described by many Greeks as a "British tool." It is believed that the British had from the start intended to make him premier, and that they had never regarded the premiership of Venizelos as more than a temporary expedient. Moreover the Venizelists are said to find it difficult to understand why the British should praise Papandreou as more forceful than Venizelos who was responsible for the suppression of the mutiny in the armed forces. They feel that Venizelos, during the brief tenure of the premiership, made a significant contribution to the Allied cause, and are annoyed that the British have taken no notice of this fact.

Men like Exindaris (close political adviser of Venizelos, and representative of the major political parties of Greece at the Cairo Conference in August 1943) and Kanellopoulos (Vice Premier of the Tsouderos Government who was forced to resign in March 1943) are of the opinion that the British are backing Papandreou because of their determination to crush the entire left wing movement (including the EAM and the PEEA), and to force the restoration of the King. Fearing that Papandreou would fit in willingly with this scheme, and resenting the fact that Papandreou was appointed without consultation of Greek political leaders, Exindaris and Kanellopoulos are reported to have urged Venizelos (23-26 April) to retract his resignation of 23 April. At least twice Venizelos seemed to have been won over to their point of view. But just when it was decided that Admiral Voulgaris should form a "service" government to hold office only until a coalition cabinet could be formed, it was learned (26 April) that Papandreou had already taken the

oath of office. It was then too late to block Papandreou's appointment and to wrest the direction of Greek affairs from the British.

Others, like Bodosakis, powerful munitions manufacturer, a recent arrival in Egypt from the United States, who controls certain Liberal politicians in Cairo, dislike Papandreou because they consider him less amenable to dictation than Venizelos. Bodosakis, who is said to have financed and directed the mutinies in the armed forces because of his eagerness to drive Tsouderos from the government, has been arrested by the British on the personal order of Prime Minister Churchill.

In general, distrust of Papandreou is reported to be widespread among the Greeks in Cairo. The new Premier is admittedly faced with great difficulties in his present task of organizing a government of national unity. For this very reason, some observers consider it unfortunate that his appointment was heralded by so much publicity concerning his unfriendliness to the EAM and his acceptability to the British. Moreover, his opening address before the Lebanon Conference, in which he sharply attacked the EAM, and stated that the only question standing in the way of unity was whether the EAM would collaborate with its rivals or not, is not expected to facilitate his task.

IV. THE EAM AND THE PEEA

Ever since the summer of 1943 the largest and most effective of the resistance movements, together with its two principal rivals in the underground -- the EDES led by Col. Zervas and the EKKA led by the late Col. Psarros -- has been insisting on an expansion of the Cairo Cabinet. For several months Tsouderos managed to evade the issue. At length, the pressure became so great that he was compelled to agree to the demands in principle, but he insisted that he would take no

steps in this direction until the guerrilla bands terminated their fratricidal strife. In response to this demand the internal war, which had started in the middle of October 1943 was officially terminated at the end of February 1944. But even after the termination of the conflict (which some Greeks claim never amounted to more than an occasional skirmish between small groups of men), Tsouderos, in the opinion of the EAM, continued his policy of procrastination. When it became known that King George had refused to sanction the demand for the Demaskinos Regency (14 March), the EAM apparently decided that it would force the issue by forming what it called the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA).

According to its founders the PEEA was established not to seek power for itself but only to represent the Greek underground in the negotiations leading toward the proposed broadening of the base of the Cairo Cabinet. However, the PEEA is reported to have made far-reaching plans for the future government of Greece. It has announced the elections for the Chamber of Deputies and has summoned members of the various government services in Greece to enroll themselves under its standard. As might have been expected Tsouderos refused to grant the PEEA recognition. He is said to regard it as representing no more than a single faction. But the PEEA ignored Tsouderos' attitude and proceeded to act like a legitimate government.

The political composition of the EAM is much debated. It is generally agreed that the EAM is Communist-led, but it is doubtful whether as many as 10 or 20 percent of its membership are ideological Communists. Only one member of the PEEA (Santos, Minister of the Interior) is a Communist. According to recent reports, the PEEA has a large following in the Athens-Piraeus area and is gaining ground because of steadily

mounting impatience of the people with the Cairo Government. Moreover the prestige of the PEEA has supposedly been enhanced by the fact that three of its ten members, including its president, Svolos, are well-known university professors. However, British intelligence reports deny the popularity of the PEEA.

In many ways the Political Committee suggests comparison with Tito's Government in Yugoslavia, with which it is in communication. Ambassador Leeper is reported to fear that the PEEA is following the Yugoslav precedent in attempting to discredit the King and the Government-in-Exile. However, while Tito has refused to deal with the regime of King Peter in Cairo, the PEEA has officially extended recognition to the Greek Government-in-Exile and has many times indicated its willingness to collaborate with it. To be sure, the PEEA and the EAMhave continued to express their opposition to the King, but they seem determined to gain a place in the only Greek Government with which the Allies maintain relations.

The EAM and the PEEA have, however, many powerful opponents. The British Foreign Office is said to be determined to pay no further attention to the EAM or its demands. Papandreou is also anti-EAM. While professing willingness to grant the EAM some representation in the coalition cabinet, he is said to fear that the EAM will use whatever foothold it can secure as a stepping stone to complete control and to the eventual establishment of a Communist dictatorship. Sophoulis and Gonatas, the leaders of the Liberal Party in Greece are reported to be taking a much more extreme view. They are allegedly laying plans for the proscription of the PEEA and of the entire EAM movement, which they say must be crushed by force. For this reason they are said to approve the campaigns of the quisling-sponsored, German-led Security Battalions against the EAM.

British intelligence services have frequently commented favorably on the size and effectiveness of the EAM, and have even minimized its defects. Nevertheless, in the fall of 1943, the British command withheld supplies from the EAM and concentrated on building up Zervas' EDES organization. This move is said to have been motivated by the hope that Zervas might be able to replace the EAM as the leading Greek resistance movement. Though this hope was not realized, some British officers still favor such a policy.

The problem has been complicated in the last few weeks by a recrudescence of friction among the rival guerrilla factions in violation of the guerrilla truce of 29 February. According to recent reports, the EAM accused its rivals of encroachment upon its domains and collaboration with the enemy and launched a series of attacks upon both EDES and the EKKA. In taking this step, the EAM seems to intend not only to destroy its rivals, but also to manifest again its displeasure over the delay in the formation of the long promised coalition cabinet. In the course of the EAM attack upon the EKKA, Col. Psarros, the EKKA commander in chief, was killed; and the EKKA itself was reduced to impotence. It is reported that the Zervas groups would have shared the same fate, except for the British support.

Some observers feel that these new manifestations of aggressiveness prove that the EAM is altogether unworthy of Allied confidence. Others have been impressed by the very seriousness of these incidents and by their implications for the future and have come to the conclusion that a careful reappraisal of the size and character of the EAM is necessary. In any case, it is apparent that the EAM, with unofficial Russian backing, constitutes at the present time the most dynamic factor in Greek politics. King George and Prime

Minister Papandreou as well as the British Government will probably be confronted in the near future with the choice between appeasing the EAM or facing a crisis similar to that of April 1944.